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Eudemian Ethical Method
Lawrence J. Jost (Cincinnati)
Students of Aristotle's philosophical methodology,
whether in ethics or elsewhere, have much to be grateful for
when they consider recent studies of the topic.

Owen's pio

neering efforts in his now classic "Tithenai ta phainomena"1
to upgrade the status of dialectic to serious partnership
with syllogistic in science and metaphysics has been modified
and elegantly extended in Nussbaum's "Saving Aristotle's Ap
pearances" in the Owen festschrift.2

While both of these

scholars have drawn heavily on material from both the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics (hereafter abbreviated NE and EE
respectively), their.primary focus has been on scientific
reasoning in general and not specifically on the practical
disciplines of ethics or politics.

Two recent studies by

Irwin and Barnes, however, have concentrated on what they
both call Aristotle's methods of ethics, drawing on a rich
critical tradition of close study of the Aristotelian works
stretching back to the early 19th Century.3 Their use of the
plural might suggest a possible differentiation of Aristotle's
thoughts on the subject by reference to various works or to
different stages in his development but one quickly discovers
that this is not the case.

This is because both Irwin and

Barnes follow the general pattern of scholarship in this area
in not distinguishing, for instance, between NE and EE dis
cussions of the topic and in drawing indifferently upon both
works in formulating an overall picture
to ethical method.

of Aristotle's approach

They do not raise the question I wish to

address here, then, in spite of the searching and valuable
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surveys of relevant passages in both works that they do provide,
not to mention the modest defence of Aristotle that they offer
in comparison with other ethical methodotogists (e.g. Sidgwick
and Rawls).

The question which I freely admit is not altogether

new is: are there any distinctive contributions that the EE, as
opposed to the NE, makes to the study of ethical method? Since
Kenny's two recent studies1* have shed a powerful new light on
the relationship between the two works I believe it is time to
consider the question afresh.

It is true that Kenny's prede

cessor in this particular vineyard, D.J. Allan, 25 years ago
in the same Symposium Aristotelicum that featured Owen's pathbreaking paper, weighed in with his "Quasi-mathematical method
in the Eudemian Ethics"5, a paper which clearly offers a plau
sible answer to my question. Allan claimed to find a distinctive
"mathematical pattern of deduction" at work in the EE, one that
applies "Euclidean method" to ethical argument and draws more
freely than does the NE on other Aristotelian works such as the
Metaphysics for its premisses.6 His account, however, seems
vulnerable in light of an important distinction that Barnes,
especially, has pressed in connection with the Posterior Ana
lytics , viz. that between a method designed for research or
the discovery of the archai or starting points of a science
thátneed not be cast in syllogistic form and the rather dif
ferent methods recommended for presentation of the results of
inquiry which may well call for a rigorous, axiomatized system.7
If suchadistinction is feasible for theoretical sciences, it

■

would seem even more likely that in ethics one need not oppose
as irreconcilable the more informal dialectical method of pre
senting and sifting through various endoxa (opinions which
have found favor with the many or the wise) and a formally
valid deductive demonstration such as that found in EE II.1
(1218b31-1219a39), an argument which, as Woods has observed,
"is considerably more elaborate than the corresponding argu-
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ment in E.N."8 Thus, even if Allan were correct in directing
our attention to a preference in the EE for a quasi-geometric
laying down of hypotheses, this fact would not preclude simul
taneous appeal to the endoxic method for the generation of ac
ceptable archai or starting points.

Furthermore, while the NE

does not use 'hypothesis' in its technical sense (as does the
EE at 1222b28 and 1230b30) in its undisputed books

(i.e. I-IV

and VIII-X), it does, as Kenny notes9, employ 'hypokeitai' in
the requisite fashion at least once at 1104b27. The most conreason
vincing^for not treating Allan's proposal as the key to a dis
tinctive ethical method, however, is that the best and clearest
statements of endoxic method in the entire corpus are either to
be found in exclusively Eudemian material or in the so-called
common or disputed books (NE V,VI,VII = EE IV,V,VI). This can
be easily established by consulting any of the authorities al
ready mentioned. Owen, Nussbaum, Irwin and Barnes all use the
same passage

from the book on akrasia, i.e. 1145b2-7, as well

as similar remarks from the same discussion, as the foundation
for their conceptions of endoxic method. Even more striking
than this is the appeal to undoubtedly Eudemian passages such
as 1216b26-3410 or 1214b28-1215a711. None of these scholars
ha«

paused to ask why the choicest passages for illustrating

the method come from outside securely Nicomachean borders.
That such distinguished Aristotelian interpreters ignore this
question testifies to the overwhelming inertia of the tradition's
full 10-book N E ,influencing even those who appreciate the EE's
potential contributions to theory but see no reason to award
it the disputed books let alone entertain the possibility that
its undisputed portions may represent an advance on the NE. In
the light, however, of Kenny's systematic study of these and
other questions concerning the relationship between the two
works, the fact that the Eudemian environment is particularly
hopitable to endoxic method by comparison with the NE is surely
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worthy of note, even extended examination.
Before going on to contrast the two works on questions of
method in some detail, it will be helpful to appeal to an impor
tant hypothesis about the common or disputed books.

Although

there is not space to argue the point here, I have elsewhere
outlined Kenny's treatment of the problem and even so skepti
cal a scholar as C.J. Rowe has been convinced by Kenny's ar
guments .12 The claim is that the disputed books are clearly
more at home in their Eudemian rather than Nicomachean sur
roundings, a result based on a "succession of arguments, his
torical, philological, and philosophical" presented in The
Aristotelian Ethics13, especially those based on the computerassisted statistical study of vocabulary and style which con
stitutes the heart of Kenny's case. An indication that the
book as a whole makes a very strong case, indeed, can be seen
in Rowe's recent admission that his own previous intuition
(shared by most scholars, perhaps) that the NE contained the
CB (Common Books) as an integral part of an organic whole had
been "deal[t] a near-lethal blow" by Kenny's work and that he
is now inclined to accept Kenny's solution to the CB problem,
having renounced his own earlier and opposing position.1** Al
though many no doubt remain unconvinced by this controversial
call for a radical re-assessment of our views of the EE-NE re
lationship I will nonetheless hypothesize for purposes of this
discussion of methodology that references drawn from the middle
books (to be referred to by the familiar Bekker numbers with a
CB prefix, e.g. CB 1145b2-7) are not to be treated as expressing
NE doctrine; indeed, the opposite is more likely to be the case,
viz. that they reflect EE content that may or may not be compat
ible with NE views.
The strategy in what follows will be to look first at un
doubtedly NE passages for methodological remarks, noting how
spare such as can be found really are when compared with un-
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doubtedly EE material. Eventually we shall be in position to
suggest that it is the EE and not the NE which must be given
the credit for containing the fullest account of a fully selfconscious employment of endoxic method in ethics, the same
general method that commetators are so ready to see at work in
other important Aristotelian works such as the Physics and Meta
physics.

That such a finding would tend to support Allan's "im-

ression...that the systematizer [the author of the EE] is the
later Aristotle" as well as Kenny's conjecture^%íie EE postdates
the N E 15 is a partial and tentative result of a series of re
lated investigations that I've begun in order to test,Kenny's
hypothesis.16
In the first book of the NE the most explicitly methodo
logical passages are two (viz. 1094bll-27 and 1098a26-b8), both
of which stress the need to give up any thoughts of achieving
accuracy (ακρίβεια) in ethical-political inquiry primarily due
to the variability of the subject matter itself as compared
with that of geometry, say. This, of course, is a familiar and
endearing theme in Aristotle's ethics but the passages taken
together do not compare very favorably with EE I 's chapter 6
as a whole which provides a clearly worked out account not only
of endoxic method at 1216b26-35 as employing phainomena as wit
nesses and paradigms of the truth but also introduces more
subtlety and scientific sophistication in its discussion of
what to look for in a properly philosophical account. Whereas
the NE is content to recommend that the educated person be
sesitive enough to expect demonstration from a mathematician
but not from a rhetorician, the EE worries about even the ex
perienced and capable going astray by being urged to swallow
arguments that are "foreign to the inquiry (αλλοτριουί) and
/
idle (κεναυ5)" [Woods' rendition of 1217a2-3; unless other
wise indicated further English versions of EE passages will be
drawn from this (partial) translation]. That is, those students
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who know that they should welcome explanations°%he why (to dia ti)
of things as well as the that (to ti)(1216b38-9) and that philosophers should never "speak in an unconsidered fashion (εικτι ),
but always with reason"

(μετά λογου)(1217al-2) still may be

taken in by the "ignorance" or "charlatanry" of "men who nei
ther have nor are capable of architectonic or practical thought"
(1217a3-7) . An example at this

juncture would certainly help

but, perhaps, the criticism at b21 of Plato's Form of the Good
will suffice if we grant that a "logical" point about Forms be
longs to another study (ετέρο^ átatpiBhS )r one "foreign to"
ethics or politics, strictly speaking. The language of the dis
missal - λέγεται λογικω£ και κενω$ - recalls 1217al-2, at least
in part, although it must be admitted that Plato can not be
accused of trickery or ignorance. If this is an example, then,
it will be of a very sophisticated lack of relevance but one
that the student of ethics should still resist nonetheless.
While a detailed comparison.of particular passages such
as those of the last paragraph are desirable in a fuller·study,
a somewhat more impressionistic approach will indicate the type
of contrast I believe there to be between the NE and EE on
matters of method.

If we focus on the technical vocabulary of

endoxic method, especially as described by Barnes, a surprising
fact emerges fairly clearly, viz. that the undoubtedly Nicomachean portions are noteworthy for their relatively slight em
ployment of key terminology.

Take 1endoxos1 itself, for in

stance, a word that can almost always be translated as 'repu
table' or 'of good repute' even when it occurs in the familiar
neuter plural (τα ένδοξα ) meaning 'the reputable things', i.e.
reputable views or opinions.

Barnes notes that before Aristotle

(first? f^lèe^d jective to views or tenets ‘éndoxos'typically modi
fied men of considerable standing in the community in the orators
and Xenophon.17 What is most remarkable about its occurences in
the NE is that they all (apart from CB 1145b5, of course) corres-
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pond to this ordinary Attic usage. 1098b28 refers to a "few reputable men"

)

/

(ολίγοι

\V

)/

και ένδοξοι ανδρεί

),

1122b31-2 mentions the "well-born and reputable"
και το?|^ενδοξοiS ).

The neuter plurals

also to/\understood along

the same lines

for example, while
(τοί$ ευγενεσι

at

1127a21and b25 are

as

Irwin'stranslation

makes clear when he renders them both as "the qualities that win
reputation", the sort of thing that Socrates, Aristotle's exam
ple here, disavowed having. Thus, none of these NE occurrences
approximate the typical use of 'endoxa' as found in the Topics
(in its "definition" at 100b21, for instance, or as frequently
’found elsewhere - 104a21, 159bl3,14 et passim) or The Rhetoric
(e.g. 1355al7, 1357al0). Now, it is true that the undoubtedly
Eudemian avoids the term altogether and this may be significant.
By Kenny's hypothesis, however> we are entitled to see its
crucial appearance in the following central passage about akrasia
as credited to the EE account:
Here, as in all other cases, we must set down the appear
ances (phainomena)and, first working through the puzzles
(diaporesantes), in this way go on to show, if possible,
the truth of all the beliefs we hold (ta endoxa) about
these experiences; and, if this is not possible, the
truth of the greatest number and the most authoritative.
For if the difficulties are resolved and the beliefs
(endoxa) are left in place, we will have done enough
showing. (Nussbaum's rendering of CB 1145bl-718)
Two other terms that are featured in this passage also worth
comment.

The neuter plural τα φαινόμενα in the typical sense

of 'the things that seem to be the case' or 'the apparent facts'
\

/

as reflected in what is usually said (τα λεγομενα) can be fdund
elsewhere in the NE only at CB 1145b28.

This situation contrasts

most sharply with the example of the undoubtedly Eudemian which
repeatedly employs the term (e.g. at 1216b28, 1217al3, 1228al9,
1235a31, bl6-17, 1236a26 and b22).

This observation of an im

portant difference between the NE and EE vocabulary is not
meant to obscure the fact that occurrences of the cognate verb
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phainesthai (e.g. at NE 1095a30 or 1113a21 as Irwin*9for one,
interprets them) in a suitable context might

be amenable

to the general method of tithenai ta phainomena. But, it does
suggest for the NE a much less developed technical vocabulary
than that which can be routinely observed in the Physics, for
example, as described by Owen.20 When we see that the EE, on
the other hand, does conform to this pattern it does seem to
reflect a stage in the development of endoxic methodology
that is more self-conscious than that at work in the N E .
The second important term referred to above, viz. δ ια
πορεί v ('puzzling through') as well its near synonym απορεΤν
and the noun aporia can be found at NE 1096al2, 1100a21,30,bl2
and 1101a35 although the EE usage of these terms is signifi
cantly more extensive. Susemihl's index provides more than 20
relevant examples. This again suggests that the endoxic méthodes
pre-occupation with overcoming or resolving aporia ('puzzlement',
'no way out') is more routinely at work in the EE than in the NE
if we can use relative frequency of technical terminology as a
rough guide.

Furthermore, the CB's pithy η γαρ Xuois τη$ αττο-

pias ευρεσι$ ε.στιν (1146b7-8) - "for the solution of the puzzle
is a discovery", a remark which captures and admirably com
presses the final stage of the general method as described most
fully by Barnes, should not be awarded to the NE as is the cus
tom if Kenny is right about the disputed books.
That such key terms so crucial to an understanding of en
doxic method as those just canvassed are quite at home in the
EE (with the exception of 'endoxos'), while being either unused
in the relevant application in the NE (ta endoxa, ta phainomena)
or underutilized therein (diaporein, aporein, aporia), bears out
our preliminary observation that the EE's explicit^ concern with
methodology is more pronounced than the NE's as well as more in
line with what can be seen elsewhere in the corpus where the
method is at work on non-ethical subjects (e.g. the Physics or
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Metaphysics.)
Obviously, nothing uncovered so far suggests any funda
mental change in method from one work to the other, an "episte
mological break" as it were with his methodological past, but
rather a more systematic development, perhaps, and more exten
sive employment of techniques for discovery that had been nur
tured by Aristotle from his Academy days.

Whether a stronger

claim than this can be defended is difficult to say at this
Stage of the investigation.

One additional word that may be

a sign of a negative attitude toward some endoxa, those held
by the hoi polloi, is χαρίει$ , which means 'refined', 'culti
vated', 'accomplished' in Attic prose of the 4th Century B.C.
It can be found nine times in the NE but not at all in the E E .
Since the Topics first opposed the views of the many to those
of the wise, playing off each against the other whenever pos
sible, although both are sources of endoxa, Aristotle's works
are studded with this sort of dialectical relationship.

When

the NE uses 'charientes' in place of the more customary 'sophoi',
then, the contrast with the EE is worth comment.

The term it

self is familiar from Plato who employs it to refer to a group
of wags or witty critics (comic poets like Aristophanes?) at
Republic 452B and also later in the same work at 605B where
Grube translates it as "the better sort of citizens"

(χαριεσ-

xepouj). Aristotle's usage is similar in that it can be re
stricted to a particular sub-group of specialists

(the best

doctors at NE 1102a21) or, more typically, to denote the truly
cultivated gentlemen of the polis who will be expected to be
have with appropriate noblesse oblige (1128a31, bl,1162bl0). We
know from the Politics that mere position in the social struc
ture does not bestow the quality of refinement (1297b9); hence,
a degree of culture and sophistication are no doubt necessary.
In spite of this, however, there can be no doubt that‘charieis1
is a term with overtones of class and suitable breeding, a note
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not heard in the EE. A typical appearance of the word occurs at
NE 1095al8-19 where it obviously does duty for 'sophos'.

After

noting that both hoi polloi kai hoi charientes agree on synonyms
for eudaimonia he goes on to point out with some emphasis that
hoi polloi don't provide the same account of its nature or
essence as hoi sophoi. Similarly, at 1095b22, whereas the many
are drawn toward a life of shameful self-indulgence the charien
tes kai praktikoi (the refined with a practical orientation,
taking the και explicatively) prefer honor (time).

Thus, by his

choice of loaded language Aristotle seems to betray an attitude
of favoritism toward the opinions of the wise or refined, a fact
which threatens to undermine the objectivity of the endoxic me
thod. That is, we are presumably supposed to sift through all
relevant opinions that are worth study, preserving the best and
discarding the rest. The danger of bias would be even more ap
parent if a negative attitude toward the many were also evident
(as in the case of Plato).

Now, Barnes claims to see here at

NE 1095al8 "[r]espect for the views of οι πολλοί" even as he
notes in passing a text that clearly goes against this sugges
tion, viz. 1095bl6 where the many are linked with those who are
φορτικώτατοι

('most common',

'most vulgar') in their choice of

the lowest of the three lives.21 The picture seems to be one
where the unanimous agreement of the many, the wise and the
refined, such as we find in the equation of eudaimonia with
to eu zen

and to eu prattein (1095al9), is a sufficient guar

antee of the worth of the endoxon. Where they differ, however,
the "better sort" are more likely to be in the right. A good
example comes from Book X where Anaxagoras' view of what makes
for the happy man is said to appear strange to the many (NE
1179al3-15) who judge by externals; the author goes on to say
"the beliefs of the wise would seem to accord with our argu
ments"

(Irwin). It is true that Aristotle goes on to suggest

that the truth in practical matters must be judged by deeds
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and life as it is actually lived (al7-20), seeming to suggest
a return to the many's terra firma. The appearance is mislead
ing, though, for, by the end of the chapter we are once again
on the side of the wise and the contemplative, secure in the
assurance that they are the most beloved of the gods as well
as the happiest of men (1179a29-32).

The impression, then,

of the preparation of a brief for the wise carefully prepared
by the NE as a whole certainly contrasts at first glance with
the advice offered a would-be sophistical refuter at SE 173a2023 where an even-handed strategy is recommended:
You ought to lead men to opinions opposed to those of
the majority (πολλοί^) and of the wise - if a man speaks
as trained arguers do, you should lead him to opinions
opposed to the majority; if he speaks as do the majority,
to opinions opposed to expert reasoners. (Forster)
Even here the -author can not help but point out at a28-31 that
the opinion of the many is only nomos ('custom',

'law') while

things said by the wise reflect physis ('nature') and alitheia
('truth'). In other words, even supposedly democratic Sophists
show a decided preference for the wise.

We expect Aristotle

not to be similarly biased if he is to remain faithful to his
method and yet the NE can be read (I don't say must be) as vin
dicating the charientic side of debates more often than not.
Is the EE more even-handed?

There are some signs that

it is when we consider,for example, how it deals with first
philia (the primary sort of frienship that exists between two
equally virtuous men) when contrasted with the parallel NE
treatment. The latter account is uncomfortable with the clear
fact that men call pleasure-friends and utility-friends philoi;
it proposes therefore to derive these secondary forms καθ'
ομοχοτητα from the primary and governing use of the word (protos
kai kurios) as said of virtue-friends (NE 1157a25-32). In what
certainly appears to be a reply to this passage the EE rejects
the idea that pleasure-friends are not really friends because
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they fall below first philia standards of reliability(EE 1236b
17-21).

Introducing the important idea of pros hen homonymy,

the EE goes on to claim:
Therefore to confine the use of the term friend to pri
mary friendship is to do violence to the phainomena, and
compels one to talk paradoxes; though it is not possible
to bring all friendship under one definition. The only re
maining alternative, therefore, is, that in a sense the
primary sort of friendship alone is friendship, but in a
sense all sorts are, not as having a common name by ac
cident and standing in a merely chance relationship to
one another, nor yet as falling under one species, but
rather as related to one thing. (Rackham, 1236b21-6)
This obvious defence of ordinary language via the sophisticated
device of 'focal meaning' certainly appears to be a careful re
action to the NE's predicament of wishing to maintain a rigid
hierarchy of eide of philia and yet deign to speak with the
vulgar of friends whose only ties are pleasure or utility. The
EE brings in one of the most powerful tools from the metaphysi
cal arsenal to rectify the situation.

Each form of philia is

related to a common focus while the priority of virtue-friend
ship is preserved without flying in the face of the many's way
o■£ talking or siding only with the charientes.
The argument of the last paragraph will no doubt be re
sisted by many scholars and much more needs to be said to shore
up its main assumptions.

Pending that, can anything of the im

pressionistic variety avail us here?

Does the EE, for instance,

show a more postive attitude to the many than the NE?

At 1222al7

the agathos is said to feel delight (chairein) as he should ,(hos
dei) even if it is more delight than the hoi polloi experience
and at 1222a40 both we ourselves and the many posit as a vice
opposed to the mean state a direction we are more inclined to
embrace. Neither of these texts casts aspersions on the many.
The brave man at 1228b34 and 37 is said to be less vulnerable
than the hoi polloi kai hoi pleistoi to certain pressures, but
this is not surprising nor detrimental to the many.

A hint of
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snobbery seems to emerge at 1238a27 where it is said that "even
the many would agree" with a claim about philia but this passage
is hardly an indictment. Again, at 1243a38 a slightly cynical
tone seems to lie behind the statement that hoi polloi pursue
to kalon ek periousias ('out of a state of surplus or plenty'),
implying that virtue is easier to go after when times are good.
But, while certainly true enough, such an observation need not^
betray a sustained antipathy to the many as we saw conveyed, for
instance, by the 'most vulgar' label noted above in the NE. None
of these or similar passages that crop up in the EE would support
such a negative stance although one very important text not yet
mentioned has been interpreted by Barnes as recommending that
"opinions peculiar to <Λ πολλοί, the vulgar herd, should be ig
nored".22 This is the textually very difficult passage at 1214b
28-1215a7 which requires emendations that are far from certain:
It would be superfluous to examine all the opinions about
happiness that find adherents. Many opinions are held by
children and by the diseased and mentally unbalanced, and
no sensible man would concern himself with puzzles about
them; the holders of such views are in need, not of argu
ments, but of maturity in which to change their opinions,
or else of correction of a civil or medical kind (for med
ical treatment is no less a form of correction than flog
ging is). Similarly, neither need we examine the views of
the many; they speak in an unreflective way on almost any
topic, most of all when they speak about this; only the
opinions of reasonable men should be examined; it would
be strange to present argument to those who need not ar
gument, but experience. But, as each inquiry has its own
problems, so, evidently does that concerning the best and
highest life. It is these opinions, then, that it is right
for us to investigate; for the refutation of those who
dispute a certain position is a demonstration of the op
posing view (Woods, with my emphasis on the sentence at a3)
If we accept the Greek text behind this translation, it certainly
does look as though a resolute opposition to the views of the
many is, after all, at work in the EE. Still, one should be wary
of endorsing this option. Irwin joins Decarie23 in treating the
underlined phrasing above as an obvious intrusive gloss and a
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glance at Susemihl's apparatus or even Barnes' discussion re
veals many proposals for generating a sound text. What does seem
clear, h o w e v e r ^ ^ a s ^ ^ d e ? the sick and insane to the NE's youths
as unlikely sources of endoxa worth serious consideration and it
does carefully specify its reasons for each exclusion.

In this

connection it is at least curious that a passage from the Meta
physics , viz. 1009b5-6, mentions the sick and insane as sources
of error even if per impossibile only two or three persons were
found to be still healthy and sensible. It is tempting to suggest
that in composing the EE Aristotle has decided to broaden his ac
count of those unlikely to merit attention to their endoxa beyond
the inexperienced young so disparaged in Book I of the NE. There
remains, of course, the considerable difficulty of reconciling
the rest of this important passage with our suggestion that the
EE's way with the many is benign. Only a full-scale philological
treatment of the disputed passage starting from the manuscripts
themselves can be expected to resolve this issue, making a fur
ther advance possible.
At this point our study of vocabulary and selected explicit
methodological passages has provided some support for questioning
the widely held traditional assumption that the NE either shares
unequivocally and to the same degree the endoxic method of the EE
or that in any case it represents an advance on the latter.

We

cannot claim, of course, to have demonstrated that the opposite
opinion is true, either. Considerations have been advanced, how
ever, that scholars sympathetic to Kenny's case for the EE can
and should pursue in future research.

This should, above all,

concentrate on detailed comparisons of lengthy and parallel texts
where endoxic method is at work. The three books on friendship
are a prime candidate for such study as^iême individual chapters
on particular virtues. In an APA presentation21* last year I urged
an interpretation of the EE's treatment of the aporiai about
friendship that sees it not Only as fuller, better documented
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and more carefully laid out than its counterpart but, more im
portantly, it shows clearer signs than does the NE of the "aporemetic method" at work in the Metaphysics that Alan Code has
so well described in recent contributions.25 In this regard it
is worth quoting one more passage from the E E ;
Accordingly a line of argument must be taken that will
best explain to us the views held on these matters and
at the same time solve the difficulties and contradic
tions. And this will be secured if the contradictory
views are shown to be held with some reason. For such
a line of argument will be most in agreement with the
phainomena: and in the upshot, if what is said is true
in one sense but not in another, both the contradictory
views stand good. (Rackham's translation of 1235bl3-18)
Nothing so programmatic nor as sytematically connected with CB
VII passages can be found in the parallel NE account of philia
even though its discussion as a whole is considerably longer
than the EE's·

These and other differences between these two

works surely merit further study in the light of Kenny's con
clusions. Even if the drift of the above comments on Eudemian
ethical method are contrary to the prevailing winds, I take
comfort from the following remarks with which Kenny himself
brings his first book to a close:
No doubt, when finally pressed, most scholars would say
that their belief in the [temporal] priority of the EE
to the NE rests not upon any particular argument but
upon their over-all impression of the respective philo
sophical merits of the works. Such judgments are, of
course, partly a function of variations in the fashion
ableness of criteria for judging philosophical merit;
they are also very much a function of how closely a
text has been read, analysed, and meditated upon. It
will only be when the EE has been for some time as
carefully and widely studied as the NE has been for
centuries that we shall be able to make an unclouded
judgment about their comparative worth.26
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